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UK	expertise	on	health	security	could	be	a	strong
card	in	the	Brexit	negotiations	–	but	few	seem	to
realise	it
Little	public	attention	has	been	given	to	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	management	of	cross-border
health	threats	and	their	implications	for	the	UK’s	influence	on	relevant	EU	policy-making,	explains
John	Connolly.	While	the	negotiations	haven’t	yet	addressed	this	issue,	it	ought	to	be	raised
before	the	next	disease	crisis	happens.
The	decision	to	leave	the	EU,	and	the	government’s	commitment	to	leave	the	Single	Market	and
Customs	Union,	has	led	the	media,	academics,	and	politicians	to	use	the	term	‘crisis’	when
articulating	the	number	of	potential	implications	(e.g.	for	the	economy,	citizens’	rights,	and	for	the	EU	project	as	a
whole).	Less	attention	has	been	given	to	the	management	of	cross-border	threats	within	the	EU,	and	the	possible
implications	of	Brexit	for	the	UK’s	influence	on	EU	policy-making.	This	hasn’t	been	a	matter	for	the	early
negotiations	nor	can	it	really	be	described	as	a	matter	that’s	been	given	much	attention	by	political	elites	(perhaps
when	the	next	disease	crisis	happens	–	like	pandemic	flu,	foot	and	mouth,	avian	flu	outbreaks	etc.	–	this	situation
will	change!).
In	recent	history,	officials	within	the	Department	of	Health,	Public	Health	England,	and	the	Department	for	the
Environment,	Food	and	Rural	Affairs	have	proven	to	be	very	influential	in	shaping	EU	policy	regarding	the
managements	of	cross-border	threats	to	public	and	animal	health.	Much	of	this	influence	comes	from	the	fact	that
the	UK	has	considerable	expertise	in	epidemiological	and	disease	management,	developed	significantly	since	the
disastrous	2001	foot	and	mouth	crisis.
After	the	foot	and	mouth	crisis,	the	EU	legislative	architecture	for	crisis	management	tightened,	resulting	in	new
governing	arrangements	within	the	European	Commission	for	planning	and	dealing	with	health	threats	(including
for	those	at	the	animal	and	human	interface).	In	many	senses,	these	developments	echoed	broader	moves	in
European	integration,	resulting	in	the	EU	being	described	as	a	‘crisis	manager’,	with	both	internal	and	external
dimensions.
Cooperation	is	just	good	common	sense?	Surely	it’s	not	a	political
matter….
Yet	even	before	Brexit	was	on	the	table	it	would	be	incorrect	to	assume	that	there	was	a	lack	of	politics	between
Member	States	regarding	ever	closer	collaboration	on	health	security	governance.	The	fact	that	diseases	cross
borders,	and	that	inter-state	collaboration	might	be	intuitively	just	‘good	common	sense’,	it	would	be	incorrect	to
assume	that	integration	processes	have	somehow	been	devoid	of	political	interests	or	power	posturing	at	a	civil
service	or	technocratic	level.
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On	a	recent	health	security	project,	I	cited	an	interview	with	a	senior	official	in	Public	Health	England	who
maintained	that,	although	pan-EU	cooperation	on	disease	control	is	important,	it	can	also	be	a	‘distraction’.	This	is
because	the	UK’s	experience	and	expertise	in	health	security	governance	draws	them	into	unwelcome	politico-
bureaucratic	situations	where	they	are	required,	along	with	France	and	Germany,	to	build	capacity	with	less
developed	and	often	newer	Member	States	in	the	interests	of	the	European	project.
On	the	plus	side,	for	the	UK,	this	has	led	to	the	accumulation	of	a	great	deal	of	soft	power	and	influence	over	EU
policy-making.	Indeed,	the	UK	provides	EU	institutions	with	much	of	its	expertise	given	that	the	UK’s	world-
leading	scientific	research	laboratories	have	made	vital	contributions	to	the	development	of	public	and	animal
health	management	capacities	in	several	Member	States.	James	Wilsdon	reflects	on	this	point	in	his	article	in
Nature.	He	notes	that	the	referendum	result	poses	challenges	for	the	future	of	expert-based	networks:
The	difficulty	is	that	UK–EU	networks	of	expertise,	guidance	and	oversight	are	complementary,	and
have	developed	in	tandem	over	many	years.	Generations	of	British	scientists	and	experts	have
shaped	EU	frameworks…	Around	every	issue	that	is	codified	in	law	or	regulation	there	exists	a	softer
sphere	of	influence,	information	exchange	and	standard-setting.
Soft	power	leading	to	solid	outcomes	for	the	UK?
There	are	unknowns	with	regards	to	whether	the	UK’s	soft	power	will	be	to	its	advantage	in	securing	gains	within
the	Brexit	negotiation	processes	for	more	scientific	or	technical	areas	of	public	policy.	It	will	be	the	role	of	political
scientists	at	a	later	point	to	determine	the	implications	of	Brexit	for	the	dynamics	of	bureau-political	relationships
pertaining	to	disease	management	and	control,	yet	it	is	highly	conceivable	that	established	networks	in	the	UK	for
health	security	governance	will	play	key	roles	in	determining	the	extent	and	architecture	of	change	processes.
A	major	challenge,	however,	is	that	disease-induced	crises	can	come	from	various	sources	and	can	have
cascading	effects	for	a	range	of	policy	areas.	For	example,	EU	procedures	for	health	security	governance	have
implications	for	agricultural	policy	and	for	policy	regulating	the	food	chain	–	the	governance	of	which	affects	the
operation	of	the	Single	Market,	which	the	UK	has	decided	to	leave.
Similarly,	Brexit	has	produced	unprecedented	uncertainties	with	regards	to	coordination	between	policy
communities.	Take	the	veterinary	profession	as	a	case	in	point.	Brexit	will	have	major	implications	for	this
profession	(who	are	often	key	crisis	responders	to	disease	outbreaks)	given	that	EU	public	policy	has	implications
for	their	work	across	public	health,	animal	welfare,	food	safety,	and	farming.		This	is	highlighted	by	the	recent
editorial	commentary	in	the	Veterinary	Record:
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Vets,	along	with	everyone	else,	will	be	affected	by	Brexit,	but	because	of	the	wide	range	of	roles	they
fulfil	in	relation	to	animal	health	and	welfare	and	public	health,	and	because	much	of	this	activity	is
governed	by	EU	legislation,	they	could	be	affected	more	than	most…[T]he	decision	to	leave	will
inevitably	have	an	impact	on	many	aspects	of	veterinary	endeavour,	whether	in	relation	to	farm	and
companion	animal	health	and	welfare,	disease	surveillance,	food	safety	and	public	health,	or
veterinary	education	and	research.	It	could	also	have	implications	for	the	availability	of	veterinary
medicines	and	the	position	of	EU	agencies	and	disease	reference	laboratories	currently	located	in	the
UK.
So…lots	to	decouple	if	‘Brexit	means	Brexit’.	Theresa	May	often	repeats	this	mantra	but	if	we	take	this	comment
to	its	logical	conclusions	then,	for	health	security,	the	UK	will	be	excluded	from	the	European	Centre	for	Disease
Control	and	will	not,	in	theory,	be	privy	to	intelligence	through	the	alert	and	communication	systems	(known	as
the	EU	Early	Warning	and	Response	arrangements).	Broader	information-sharing	with	regards	to	public	health
initiatives	and	practices	will	be	affected,	with	aspects	of	these	having	population	health	dimensions.	So,	if	there
was	evidence	of	bureaucratic	politics	pre-Brexit,	then	it	is	not	‘bad	sense’	to	hypothesise	that	Brexit	poses	further
risks	for	multi-level	and	inter-state	cooperation	on	health	security	matters.
‘Post-Brexit’	–	a	red	herring?
Moreover,	Brexit	provides	no	guarantee	that	the	UK	will	be	part	of	procurement	arrangements	for	new	vaccines.
The	European	Medicines	Agency	(a	key	organisation	in	the	single	market	for	medicines	to	protect	public	and
animal	health)	is	actually	located	in	Canary	Warf	in	London	and	the	agency	itself	is	unclear	as	to	it	will	be	located
post-Brexit	–	this	will	be	a	decision	for	the	European	Council,	expected	by	October	2017.
But	the	agency	is	clear	about	the	fact	that	it	is	likely	to	see	major	organisational	change	and	that	this	will	likely
lead	to	‘major	staff	losses’.	The	spill-over	effects	of	Brexit	will	also	be	seen	in	related	areas	such	as	a	changed
relationship	with	the	European	Food	Safety	Authority.	This	body	aims	to	protect	the	public,	animals,	and	the
environment	from	food-related	risks.	In	a	typical	year,	approximately	180	UK-based	experts	contribute	to	the	work
of	the	Authority	and	Brexit	has	thrown	up	uncertainties	about	the	future	roles	of	such	experts	‘who	tend	to	be
more	rigorous	than	their	continental	peers’.
A	further	challenge	is	around	departmental	inputs	to	Brexit	negotiations.	The	UK	Department	for	the	Environment,
Food	and	Rural	Affairs	(DEFRA)	has	a	significant	and	very	broad	policy	remit	as	one	of	the	most	‘Europeanised’
government	departments.	But,	at	the	same	time,	the	department	has	suffered	consistent	cuts	in	its	budget	since
2010.
Public	Health	England,	as	the	UK’s	key	agency	for	coordinating	the	public	health	aspects	of	health	security,	has
made	no	announcements	regarding	the	possible	implications	for	contingencies	management	for	transnational
public	health	crises.	This	clearly	reflects	a	general	unease	across	civil	service	departments	and	agencies	about
putting	out	any	messages	that	might	contradict	negotiating	lines	being	put	together	by	the	government’s	Brexit
department.
Another	point	here	is	that	Brexit	was	never	really	meant	to	happen	–	it	was	a	political	gamble	gone	wrong	by
Cameron’s	government	–	and	civil	servants	are	simply	in	a	state	of	policy	and	organisational	ambiguity	about	the
direction	and	consequences	of	the	negotiations.	Officials	will	be	trying	to	bring	rationality	to	a	very	irrational	set	of
policy	circumstances.
That	said,	it	is	important	to	not	forget	that	Brexit	is	a	process	and	there	might	not	be	any	post-	about	it	i.e.	it	will
be	more	likely	of	a	case	of	policy	refinement,	recalibration,	and	incremental	adjustment	to	existing	governing
relationships	given	the	fact	that	the	EU	institutions	need	UK	expertise	on	health	security	matters.	This	knowledge
and	expertise	(or	soft	power)	is	likely	to	help	the	UK’s	position	in	the	negotiation	processes.	A	broader	point	is
that	the	UK’s	‘softer’	power	sources	could	do	with	some	more	attention	by	political	commentators	because	this
might	be	where	the	real	influence	on	the	contours	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	actually	lie.
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This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	It
first	appeared	on	the	BPP	blog.
John	Connolly	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Public	Policy	at	the	University	of	the	West	of	Scotland.	He	is	currently
working	on	a	Carnegie	Scotland-funded	project	that	focuses	on	Brexit	and	security	governance	(with	Dr	Andrew
Judge	at	the	University	of	Glasgow).	Dr	Connolly	is	also	part	of	an	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council-
funded	project	that	is	researching	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	UK	fisheries	policy.
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